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HIDDEN POLYNOMIAL(S) CRYPTOSYSTEMS
ILIA TOLI
Abstract. We propose variations of the class of hidden monomial
cryptosystems in order to make it resistant to all known attacks.
We use identities built upon a single bivariate polynomial equation
with coefficients in a finite field. Indeed, it can be replaced by a
“small” ideal, as well. Throughout, we set up probabilistic encryp-
tion protocols, too. The same ideas extend to digital signature
algorithms, as well. Our schemes work as well on differential fields
of positive characteristic, and elsewhere.
1. Introduction
This paper focuses on Hidden Monomial Cryptosystems, a class of
public key cryptosystems first proposed by Imai and Matsumoto [?]. In
this class, the public key is a set of polynomial nonlinear equations. The
private key is the set of parameters that the user chooses to construct
the equations. Before we discuss our variation, we review briefly a
simplified version of the original cryptosystem, better described in [?].
The characters met throughout this paper are:
• Alice who wants to receive secure messages;
• Bob who wants to send her secure messages;
• Eve, the eavesdropper.
Alice takes two finite fields Fq < K, q a power of 2, and β1, β2, . . . , βn
a basis of K as an Fq-vector space. Next she takes 0 < h < q
n such
that h = qθ + 1, and gcd(h, qn − 1) = 1. Then she takes two generic
vectors u = (u1, . . . , un) and v = (v1, . . . , vn) upon Fq, and puts
1:
(1) v = uq
θ
u.
The condition gcd(h, qn − 1) = 1 is equivalent to requiring that the
map u 7−→ uh on K is 1↔1 ; its inverse is the map u 7−→ uh
′
, where
h′ is the inverse multiplicative of h modulo qn − 1.
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1In this paper we reserve boldface to the elements of K thought as vectors
upon Fq in the fixed private basis. They are considered vectors or field elements, as
convenient, without further notice. This shift in practice takes a Chinese Remainder
Theorem. In order to avoid boring repetitions, Cryptosystem and Scheme are used
like synonyms.
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In addition, Alice chooses two secret affine transformations, i.e., two
invertible matrices A = {Aij} and B = {Bij} with entries in Fq, and
two constant vectors c = (c1, . . . , cn) and d = (d1, . . . , dn).
Now she sets:
(2) u = Ax + c and v = By + d.
Recall that the operation of raising to the qk-th power in K is an
Fq-linear transformation. Let P
(k) = {p
(k)
ij } be the matrix of this linear
transformation in the basis β1, β2, . . . , βn, i.e.:
(3) βq
k
i =
n∑
j=1
p
(k)
ij βj , p
(k)
ij ∈ Fq,
for 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n. Alice also writes all products of basis elements in
terms of the basis, i.e.:
(4) βiβj =
n∑
ℓ=1
mijℓβℓ, mijℓ ∈ Fq,
for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Now she expands the equation (1). So she
obtains a system of equations, explicit in the v, and quadratic in the
u. She uses now her affine relations (2) to replace the u, v by the x, y.
So she obtains n equations, linear in the y, and of degree 2 in the x.
Using linear algebra, she can get n explicit equations, one for each y
as polynomials of degree 2 in the x.
Alice makes these equations public. Bob to send her a message
(x1, x2, . . . , xn), substitutes it into the public equations. So he obtains
a linear system of equations in the y. He solves it, and sends y =
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) to Alice.
To eavesdrop, Eve has to substitute (y1, y2, . . . , yn) into the pub-
lic equations, and solve the nonlinear system of equations for the un-
knowns x.
When Alice receives y, she decrypts:
y1, y2, . . . , yn
⇓
v = By + d
⇓
v =
∑
viβi
⇓
u = vh
′
⇓
x = A−1(u− c).
In Eurocrypt ′88 [?], Imai and Matsumoto proposed a digital signa-
ture algorithm for their cryptosystem. At Crypto ′95, Jacques Patarin
HIDDEN POLYNOMIAL(S) CRYPTOSYSTEMS 3
[?] showed how to break this cryptosystem. He noticed that if one takes
the equation v = uq
θ+1, raises both sides on the (qθ− 1)-th power, and
multiplies both sides by uv, he gets the equation uvq
θ
= uq
2θ
v that
leads to equations in the x, y, linear in both sets of variables. Es-
sentially the equations do not suffice to identify uniquely the message,
but now even an exhaustive search will be feasible. The system was
definitively insecure and breakable, but its ideas inspired a whole class
of public key cryptosystems and digital signatures based on structural
identities for finite field operations [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
Actually, the security of this class lies on the difficulty of the problem
of solving systems of polynomial equations. This problem is hard iff
the equations are randomly chosen. All manipulations aim to make
equations seem like that. If they really were random, the problem is
hard to Alice, too.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop
our own, new cryptosystem. Alice builds her public key by manipu-
lations as above, starting from a certain bivariate polynomial. All of
Alice’s manipulations are meant to hide from Eve this polynomial. It
is the most important part of the private key. Its knowledge reduces
decryption to the practically easy problem of solving a single univariate
polynomial.
In the third we discuss some security issues. There we explain that
practically all bivariate nonlinear polynomials are good to us to give
raise to a public key. This plentitude of choices is an important security
parameter.
In the fourth section we provide our cryptosystem with a digital
signature algorithm. In the fifth one we provide one more encryption
protocol, now a probabilistic one, in the sense that to the same cleartext
correspond zero, one, or more cyphertexts.
In the sixth one we discuss some more variations. Essentially, we
replace the single bivariate polynomial by an ideal of a small size.
In the seventh section we mention what Shannon [?] calls Uncondi-
tionally Secure Cryptosystems. Actually, this class of cryptosystems is
considered an exclusive domain of private key cryptography. This is
due mostly to the unhappy state of art of public key cryptography.
In the eighth one we extend our constructions to differential fields of
positive characteristic. We hope they are the suitable environment for
unconditionally secure public key cryptosystems.
2. A New Cryptosystem
2.1. Key Generation. Alice chooses two finite fields Fq < K, and a
basis β1, β2, . . . , βn of K as an Fq-vector space. Next she takes a generic
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(for now) randomly chosen bivariate polynomial:
(5) f(X, Y ) =
∑
ij
aijX
iY j
in K[X, Y ], such that she is able to find all its roots in K with respect
to X ; ∀ Y ∈ K, if any. For the range of i employed, this is nowadays
considered a relatively easy problem. Further, f(X, Y ) is subject to
other few constraints, that we make clear at the opportune moment.
In transforming cleartext into ciphertext message, Alice will work
with two intermediate vectors, u = (u1, . . . , un) and v = (v1, . . . , vn);
u,v ∈ K. She sets:
(6)
∑
ij
aiju
ivj = 0.
For aij 6= 0, she sets somehow:
(7) i =
ni∑
k=1
qθik , j =
nj∑
k=1
qθjk ,
where θik, θjkni, nj,∈ N∗. Here somehow means that (7) need not be
the q-ary representation of i, j. Indeed, there is no reason for it to be.
We allow to each i both opportunities: to be or not to be. Doing so
we increase our choices, whence the random-looking of the public key.
In any fashion, what we are dealing with, are nothing but identities.
Next Alice substitutes the (7) to the exponents in (6), obtaining:
(8)
∑
ij
(aijexp(u,
ni∑
k=1
qθik)exp(v,
n0∑
k=1
qθjk)) = 0;
that is:
(9)
∑
ij
(aij
ni∏
k=1
uq
θik
nj∏
k=1
vq
θjk
) = 0.
Recall that the operation of raising to the qk-th power in K
is an Fq-linear transformation. Let P
(k) = {p
(k)
ℓm} be the matrix of
this linear transformation in the basis β1, β2, . . . , βn, i.e.:
(10) βq
k
i =
n∑
j=1
p
(k)
ij βj , p
(k)
ij ∈ Fq;
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Alice also writes all products of basis elements in
terms of the basis, i.e.:
(11) βiβj =
n∑
k=1
mijkβk, mijk ∈ Fq;
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
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Now she substitutes u = (u1, u2, . . . , un), aij = (aij1, aij2, . . . , aijn),
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), and the identities (10), (11) to (9), and expands.
So she obtains a system of n equations of degree t in the u, v, where:
(12) t = max {ni + nj : aij 6= 0}.
Every term under Σ in (7) contributes by one to the degree in the u
of the polynomials.
Here we pause to give some constraints on the range of i, j in (6).
The aim of this section is to generate a set of polynomials; linear in a
set of variables, and nonlinear in another one. For that purpose, we
relate (6) and (7): aij 6= 0⇒ {ni > 1, nj = 1}.
On the other side, the size of public key will be O((2n)t+1). So, it
grows polynomially with n, and exponentially with t. Therefore, we
are interested to keep t rather modest, e.g., t = 2, 3 or so. So, we have
to choose i, j in (5), (7) in order to keep t under a forefixed bound.
Next, Alice chooses A = {Aij}, B = {Bij} ∈ GL(Fq), c,d ∈ K, and
sets:
(13) u = Ax+ c, v = By + d,
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) are vectors of variables.
Now she substitutes (13) to the equations in the u, v above, and
expands. So she obtains a system of n equations of degree t in the x,
y; linear in the y, and nonlinear in the x.
After the affine transformation, in each equation appear terms of
each degree, from zero to t; before not. This is its use; to shuffle terms
coming from different monomials of (9).
At this point, we are ready to define the cryptosystem.
2.2. The Protocol. With the notations adopted above, we define the
HPE Cryptosystem (Hidden Polynomial Equations) as the public
key cryptosystem such that:
• The public key is:
– The set of the polynomial equations in the x, y as above;
– The field Fq;
– The alphabet: a set of elements of Fq.
• The private key is:
– The polynomial (5);
– A, B, c, d as in (13);
– The identities (6) to (11);
– The field K.
• Encryption:
Bob separates the cleartext M by every n letters. If needed,
he completes the last string with empty spaces. Next he takes
an n-tuple x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of M , substitutes it to the x in
the public equations, solves with respect to the y, and sends
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y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) to Alice. We assume here that the solutions
exist, and postpone the case they do not.
• Decryption:
Alice substitutes v = B−1(y− d) ∈ K > Fq in (6), and finds
all solutions within K. There is at least one. Indeed, if x is
Bob’s cleartext, u as in (13) is one. For each solution u, she
solves:
(14) x = A−1(u− c),
and represents all solutions in the basis β1, β2, . . . , βn. It takes a
Chinese Remainder Theorem. With probability ≈ 1, all results
but one, Bob’s (x1, x2, . . . , xn), are gibberish, or even stretch
out of the alphabet.
2.3. Remarks.
2.3.1. The risc of uncertain decryption is quite virtual. It equals the
probability that another sensate combination of letters x satisfies (14)
for any root u of (6) for Bob’s y, besides the good one that always does.
Afterwards, the undesired solution has to join well with the other parts
of the decrypted message.
2.3.2. The main suspended question is that of existence of solutions.
Well, Bob succeeds to encrypt a certain message x iff Alice’s equation
(6) has solutions for u as in (13) for that x. Alice’s polynomial is a
random one. It is a well-known fact from algebra that the probability
that a random polynomial of degree m with coefficients upon a field
Fqn has a root in it is about 1−
1
e
≈ 63.2% [?, ?]. Now the remedy is
probabilistic. Alice renders the alphabet public with letters being sets
of Fq. Bob writes down a plaintext and gives start to encryption. If
he fails, he substitutes a letter of the cleartext with another one of the
same set, and retries.
After s trials, the probability he does not succeed is ≈ 1
es
; sufficiently
small for the algorithm to be trusted to succeed.
2.3.3. The other problem is that Alice may have to distinguish the
right solution among a great number of them. Here we propose a first
remedy. Her number of solution is bounded above by the degree in X
of f . So, it is beter to her to keep this degree moderate. Later in this
paper in other settings, there will be other remedies, too.
There are no bounds on the degree in Y . It can be taken whatsoever
huge.
2.3.4. Solving univariate polynomial equations is used by Patarin, too
[?, ?]. He takes a univariate polynomial:
f(x) =
∑
i,j
βijx
q
θij+qϕij +
∑
i
αix
qξi + µ0,
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and with manipulations like ours, both the same as Imai-Matsumoto
[?], he gets his public key; a set of quadratic equations. He uses two
affine transformations to shuffle the equations. We claim that the first
one adds nothing to the security.
The bigger the degree of f is, the more the public key resembles
a randomly chosen set of quadratic equations. So, it is a security
parameter. On the other side, it slows down decryption, principally by
adding a lot of undesired solutions. To face that second problem, to
the public key are added other, randomly chosen, equations. This is its
Achilles’ heel. It makes the public key overdefined, therefore subject
to certain facilities to solve [?]. So, it weakens the trapdoor problem.
We do not add equations to discard undesired solutions. So, we are
not subject to overdefined stuff. If in certain variations we do add, we
need to add less equations, however. We label wrong solutions those
that after decrypted do not make sense, or stretch out of the alphabet.
Afterall, all decrypted texts will howsoever be in a comprehensible
language (to someone or some wedget). As n grows, it is less possible to
have more than one meaningful solution. Besides, any monkey solution
that appears to Alice, appears to Eve, too. Furthermore, Eve may have
more meaningful solutions. If desired, other tests can be introduced for
that purpose. There is no need, however. The solutions, the good one
and the bad ones, are very few; no more than m.
A big advantage of our settings is that we need a lower degree poly-
nomial in X . So, we make the presence of undesired solutions virtual.
Decryption is a pure linear algebra matter.
What is most important, we have now a practically infinite range of
choices of f . This is not Patarin’s case. There the choices are bounded
below because of being easy to attack cases, and above because of being
impractical to legitimate users.
The only few constraints we put on its monomials aim to:
• keep public key equations linear in the y;
• have less undesired solutions in decryption process;
• keep the size of public key moderate;
• keep all public key equations nonlinear in th x.
We can take the degree in y unreasonably high. It gives no trouble
to us. It suffices that all the powers of y that appear in the monomials
of f are powers of q, so the public equations come linear with respect
to the y.
A new facility now is that we can take lower degree in x, as multiple
linear attack does not anymore apply, hopingly.
The constraint that all public key equations must be nonlinear in
the x is the only non-negotiable one. Indeed, if Alice violates it, the
trapdoor problem becomes fatally easy to Gro¨bner techniques.
Back to the degree in the y of the public key. Assume that the public
key equations are not linear in the y. Once Bob substitutes the x in the
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public equations, he now is not challenged to solve a nonlinear system
of equations. He is only required to find one solution of it. This can
be done within polynomial time with respect to the total degree of the
system. Later we give settings to keep public key nonlinear of modest
degree in the y.
Each of such solutions (if any) is encryption to the same cleartext.
So we have set up a probabilistic encryption protocol. To a single
cleartext may correspond zero, one, or more ciphertexts.
So, in conclusion, Alice is allowed to take for the construction of
her public key any damned bivariate polynomial. Indeed, we later
argue that f can quite well be a multivariate polynomial.
We hope this plentitude of choices is a spoil-sport to Eve.
3. Security Issues
Apparently, the only things Eve knows, are the system of public
equations, and the order of extension. By brute force, she has to take
(y1, y2, . . . , yn), to substitute it in the public key equations, to solve
in Z, or maybe Z[α], and to take the sensate solution. Almost surely,
there is only one good solution among those that she finds. She has
to find it among tn of them. However, the main difficulty to her is
just solving the system. Supposedly, it will pass through the complete
computation of Gro¨bner basis. It is a well-known hard problem. The
complexity of computations upon a field grows at most twice exponen-
tially with respect to the number of variables, and in the average case,
exponentially.
So, it is better to take n huge. This diminishes the probability that
Alice confuses decryption, however close to zero, and, what is most
important, this renders Eve’s task harder.
Alice and Bob will have to solve sets of bigger systems of linear
equations, and face Chinese Remainder Theorem for bigger n.
There exist well-known facilities [?] to solve overdefined systems of
equations. Unlike most of the rest, our public key is irrendundant, so
it is not subject to such facilities.
Now, by exhaustive search we mean that Eve substitutes the y in
the public equations, and tries to solve it by substituting values to x.
If we have d letters each of them being represented by a single element
of Fq, the complexity of an exhaustive search is O(d
n). It is easy
for Alice to render exhaustive search more cumbersome than Gro¨bner
attack. The last one seems to be the only choice to Eve.
We did not find any Known Cleartext Attack to our cryptosystem.
Eve may engineer cleartext↔ ciphertext analyses, seeking for invari-
ants or regularities there, helpful for an attack [?]. All the identities
we use, mean totousle any such regularity, and to disguise from Eve
any hint on i, j, and on the entries of A, B, c, d, and the aij ; that she
may use for such an attack.
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The complexity of the trapdoor problem is O(tn), the size of public
key O(nt+1). This fully suggests the values of parameters. n = 100,
t = 2, 3, 4 would be quite good choices.
Obviously, infinitely many bivariate polynomials give raise to the
same public key. Indeed, fixed the ground field, the degree of extension
n, and the degree of public key equations, we have a finite number of
public keys. On the other hand, there are infinitely many bivariate
polynomials that can be used like private keys.
On how does it happen, nothing is known. If ever found, any such
regularity will only weaken the trapdoor problem.
4. A Digital Signature Algorithm
Assume that we are publicly given a set of hash functions that send
cleartexts to strings of integers of fixed length nB. For the only purpose
of signing messages for Alice, Bob builds a cryptosystem as above with
qB prime, and [KB : FqB ] = nB. He to sign a message M :
• calculates H(M) = (y1, y2, . . . , ynB) = y ∈ KB;
• finds one solution (if any; otherwise, see section 2.3.2.) u of
fB(u) = y in KB.
• calculates x = B−1(u− cB);
• appends x = (x1, x2, . . . , xnB) to M , encrypts, and sends it to
Alice. (x1, x2, . . . , xnB) is a signature to M .
To authenticate, Alice first decrypts, then she:
• calculates H(M) = (y1, y2, . . . , ynB);
• substitutes (x1, x2, . . . , xnB), (y1, y2, . . . , ynB) to Bob’s public
equations;
• so she gets an nB-tuple of integers. If they all reduce to zero
modulo qB, she accepts the message; otherwise she knows that
Eve has been causing trouble.
If Eve tries to impersonate Bob and send to Alice her own mes-
sage with hash value y = (y1, y2, . . . , ynB), then to find a signature
(x1, x2, . . . , xnB), she may try to find one solution of Bob’s system of
equations for y. We trust on the hardness of this problem for the
security of authentication.
5. A Probabilistic Encryption Protocol
With the ideas described above, we are going to set up now a proba-
bilistic protocol such that only the legitimate users can send messages
to which-another. Mean, the message is meaningful iff there are no
intruders. Its being meaningful is the signature itself.
Here is the shortest possible description. Let FA and FB be Alice’s
and Bob’s public keys functions respectively, where nA = nB. To send
a message x to Alice, Bob sends her a random (this randomness is the
probabilistic pattern) element of FA(F
−1
B (x)), that she can decrypt by
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calculating FB(F
−1
A (FA(F
−1
B (x)))). So if FA(F
−1
B (x)) 6= ∅. Otherwise,
the approach is probabilistic, as in the previous section.
Here is the extended description. Each (English, e.g.) letter (or
some of them, only) is represented by a set of few (two, e.g.) elements
of the field, or strings of them. For ease of explanation, Bob’s public
equations are linear in the x, and of higher degree in the z.
Bob writes down the cleartext x and finds one solution of:
(15) x = brz
r + br−1z
r−1 + · · ·+ b0.
If there are no solutions, Bob changes a representant of a letter, and
retries. Probability issues are discussed in the previous section.
Now Bob takes the solution z of (15), and applies:
(16) y′ = B−1(z− cB).
Next he takes y′, substitutes in Alice’s public equations. So he ob-
tains a tuple y, that he sends to Alice. This is the ciphertext.
Each of other solutions of (15) give raise to other encryptions of the
same cleartext.
Alice now to decrypt, solves her equation for y within her field K.
There is at least one solution. Next she applies her inverse affine trans-
formation to all (few) solutions, and substitutes them all on Bob’s pub-
lic equations. Of that procedure all, Alice now discards all meaningless
solutions, and takes the meaningful one.
What is the trapdoor problem now? Well, on authentication matter,
nothing new. Eve has the same chances to forge here that she had
before. Recall that this kin of signatures is already best with respect
to the other ones.
On security, instead, there is a very good improvement. By brute
force, Eve has to take the ciphertext, substitute on Alice’s public key,
find all solutions, and substitute them all on Bob’s public key; then
take the sensate ones. This is worse than exhaustive search of previous
cryptosystems.
Now, what does here really mean exhaustive search? Eve now has
to search through all the elements of the common public ground field,
not just through all the alphabet. So, opting for this protocol, we can
put a lot of constraints on alphabet, in order to discard far easier the
undesired solutions, without rendering the public key overdefined.
She sets up such n-tuples, checks whether they are solutions of Alice’s
public key for Bob’s ciphertext y substituted to the variables y. If yes,
she substitutes to Bob’s public key, and checks whether does it make
sense.
What can linear multiple attack or quadratic attack [?] do in these
new settings?
Apart all, we save space and calculi. We do not need any more the
calculi and space of signature.
This protocol can be used for multiple encryption, too.
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Let us suppose that the letters are strings of a fixed length. Well,
here Alice can impose that not all strings are letters. So, in decryption
she discards a priori the solutions that contain non-letters. Doing so,
she actually has a single good solution of her polynomial, and saves
herself the effort of appealing to other tricks. In all the other schemes
throughout, such a trick fatally weakens the exhaustive search.
6. Hidden Ideal Equations
Instead of a single bivariate polynomial, Alice may choose to employ
an ideal of a very modest size. She separates the variables she employs
into two sets, {Xi}, {Yj}; one for encryption, one for decryption. She
may decide to leave one of the equations employed of higher degree
in the {Yj} after manipulations, so she gives raise to a probabilistic
encryption protocol. Alice’s parameters are:
• n = [K : Fq];
• the number s1, s2 of variables {Xi}, {Yj}, respectively;
• the number r of private equations.
So, the number of public key equations is n · r. The number of the
variables xij is n · s1, and that of the ykl is n · s2.
Alice’s number of variables, the {Xi}, is insignificant so far, so she
is supposed to be able to appeal to Gro¨bner stuff in order to solve her
system of equations within the field of coefficients for Bob’s {Yj}.
What is most important here and throughout, if Bob succeeds to
encrypt, Alice does always succeed to decrypt.
For ease of treatment, assume now that Alice does not apply affine
transformations to her variables. Bob fails encryption for a certain
cleartext (X1, . . .Xs1) iff Alice’s private ideal has no solutions in the Y
for such an (X1, . . .Xs1). Alice’s private ideal is a random one. If she
takes r ≤ s2, the probability that it has no solutions is ≈ 0, and ≈ 1
for r > s2. So, it suffices that Alice takes r ≤ s2. The critical cases
that may supervene are faced simply changing alphabet.
With slight changes, this reasoning holds in the case that Alice ap-
plies affine transformations, too.
The real problem is indeed that the solutions to Alice may be too
many; and in any case finitely many, as the base field is finite. The
best remedy to that is that Alice takes r = s1. So, the ideal that she
obtains after substitution of Bob’s ciphertext is zerodimensional (quite
easy to cause it happen), and the number of solutions is bounded above
by the total degree of the system. So, she can contain the number of
solutions by taking the total degree in the {Xi} modest, and however
each of them nonlinear.
Alice can take all equations of very low degree in the X , and then
transform that basis of the ideal they generate to another one of very
high degrees in the X . So she has a low Bezout number of the ideal,
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and higher degrees in the X , and transformations as above can take
place. If she takes the first basis linear, the number of solutions of her
equations reduce to one: Bob’s cleartext.
As soon as r > s1, the public key becomes overdefined.
Alice applies a permutation to the equations and a renumeration to
the variables before publishing her key, so Eve does not know how are
they related. She may apply affine transformations, or may not, or
may apply to only some of the Xi, Yj; at her discretion.
If s1 < s2, the size of the ciphertext is bigger than that of cleartext,
and nothing else wrong. By this case, encryption is practically always
probabilistic. Indeed, even when the equations are linear with respect
to the ykl, since there are more variables than equations, the solutions
exist, and are not unique.
Actually, Alice can take s2 rather huge. She may choose to manipu-
late some of the Yj within a subfield of K, rather than within K. Doing
so, she allows herself a big s2, and a contained size of the ciphertext.
The number of the variables ykl now is no more n · s2.
6.1. Now the size of the public key is O(s1(n)
t+1), and the complexity
of the trapdoor problem is O(tn·s1).
It is true that throughout the size of public key grows polynomially
with n, but before n becomes interesting, the public key is already
quite cumbersome. So, opting for the choices of this section we have
reasonable security with much smaller values of n. n = 20, or so,
actually are quite good. We are allowed some more values of t, too.
6.2. There exist classes of ideals called with doubly exponential ideal
membership property [?]. These are the ideals for which the calculus of a
Gro¨bner basis cannot be done within exponential time on the number
of variables, i.e., it can be done within doubly exponential time on
the number of variables. It is very interesting to know whether can
we employ them in some fashion in this class of cryptosystems. In any
fashion, this is the theoretical limit for employing solving of polynomial
systems of equations in public key cryptography.
7. Some Considerations
The idea of public key cryptography was first proposed by Diffie and
Hellman [?]. Since then, it has seen several vicissitudes [?].
A trapdoor function is a map from cleartext units to ciphertext units
that can be feasibly computed by anyone having the public key, but
whose inverse function cannot be computed without knowledge of the
private key:
• either because (at present, publicly) there is no theory to do it;
• or the theory exists, but the amount of calculations is deterring.
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Cryptosystems with trapdoor problems of the first kin are what
Shannon [?] calls Unconditionally Secure Cryptosystems.
Actually, the aim is to make trapdoor problems be equivalent to time-
honoured hard mathematical problems. However, being of a problem
hard or undecidable implies nothing about the security of the cryp-
tosystem [?, ?]. Recall that of all schemes ever invented, only two of
them, RSA [?] and ECDL [?], are going to be broken (or, at least,
are going to become impractical) by solving the hard problems they lie
upon. The rest of them have been broken with theories of no use to
solve their hard problem. So, once more, it may happen to be proved
that solving systems of differential&integral equations is undecidable,
nevertheless several cryptosystems built upon them may be easy to
break rather than secure.
The author is very fond of the idea of public key cryptography, and
believes howsoever in new developments that will make it fully suffice
for all purposes.
Actually, one tendency is that of investigating poor structures, mean,
structures with less operations, like groups, semigroups with cryptosys-
tems upon the word problem [?, ?, ?]. Yamamura’s paper [?] can be
considered pioneering on secure schemes. Unfortunately, its scheme is
still uneffective.
William Sit and the author are investigating cryptosystems upon
other algebraic structures. We are investigating among other things
whether is it possible to build effective secure schemes upon differential
fields of positive characteristic. We hope that cryptography will arouse
new interests on differential and universal algebra, too, as it did in
number theory and arithmetic geometry. One reason of optimism is
that in universal algebra one can go on further with new structures and
hard or undecidable problems forever. Until now we have appealed to
only the unary and binary arithmetic operations.
8. Generalizations on Differential Fields
Differential algebra is born principally due to the efforts of Ritt [?]
to handle differential equations by means of algebra. Actually, a dif-
ferential field is a field with a set of unary operations ′ called deriva-
tives that replace an element of the field with another one such that
(a+ b)′ = a′ + b′ and (ab)′ = ab′ + a′b.
Good references in the topic are [?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. Kaplansky’s book is
probably the best introduction in the topic.
It is possible2 to generalize the schemes given throughout using dif-
ferential polynomials instead of (5). Take K to be a finite differential
2Most of considerations given in this section are suggestions of professor Sit
through private communications.
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field extension of a differential field F of positive characteristic3. Any
such K is defined by a system of linear homogeneous differential equa-
tions, and there are structural constants defining the operations for the
derivations (one matrix for each derivation), as well for multiplication.
One can now replace (5) with a differential polynomial. The scheme
works verbatim. One can take (5) to be of higher order and degree,
that is ok too, just like the algebraic case. Euler, Clairaut, or any of
other well-studied classes of equations, or their compositions; each of
them fully suffice.
The techniques described above for polynomials, if applied to differ-
ential polynomials, will definitely make it much harder to attack any
protocol developed. Any affine transformation (by this is meant a lin-
ear combination of the differential indeterminates with not-necessarily
constant coefficients, and this linear combination is then substituted
differentially in place of the differential indeterminates) will not only
even out the degrees, but also the orders of the various partials, and
making the resulting differential polynomial very dense.
However, there is one thing to caution about: any time one specifies
these structural matrices, they have to satisfy compatibility equations.
In the algebraic case, it is the relations between P k = {pij
(k)} in (10)
and Mℓ = {mijℓ} in (11). The P
k are simply determined uniquely by
Mℓ, given the choices implicitely defined in (11).
It is very interesting to know in the algebraic case whether the system
of equations Alice obtains is invariant under a change of basis, all other
settings being equal. There is probably some group of matrices in
GL(n, q) that can do that. Such a knowledge may be used to build
attacks to all schemes of HFE class.
In the differential case there is a similar action called Loewy action,
or the gauge transformation. For ordinary differential equations, two
matrices A, B are Loewy similar if there is an invertible matrix K
such that A = δK ·K−1 +KBK−1. Using this action, one can classify
the different differential vector space structures of a finite dimensional
vector space. There is also a cyclic vector algorithm to find a special
basis, so that the differential linear system defining the vector space
becomes equivalent to a single linear ODE.
If no other problems arise for the differential algebraic schemes, there
is however one caution more for them to be unconditionally secure. We
have to avoid the exhaustive search. For that, Alice has to publish
a finite alphabet where each letter is represented by an infinite set,
disjoint sets for different letters. This is possible in differential fields,
as they are infinite. Alice renders the sets public parametrically, as
differential algebraic functions of elements of the base differential field,
and parameters, e.g., in Z. Bob chooses a letter, gives random values
3In zero characteristic numerical analysis tools seriously affect security, or at
least constrain us to more careful choices. We shall not dwell on this topic here.
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to parameters, obtains one representant of the letter, and proceeds
as above. In any case, if µ is the order of public equations, any two
elements Ξ, Θ ∈ F such that (Ξ − Θ)(µ) = 0 must represent the same
letter, if any.
The main care for Alice is that the public key equations must not
fall into tractable classes by well-known means, such as linear algebra.
In the algebraic case such constructions do not make sense. Eve can
anyway appeal to Gro¨bner attack. Besides, in any fashion such data
enable her to guess q.
The size of the public key now is actually O(nto+1), where o is the
order of public key equations. Quite explosive. However, a first tool
to contain it is the low characteristic of the field. So, we see a lot
of monomials reduce to zero. The best consolation is that we do not
have to go far away with parameters. The trapdoor problem is sim-
ply undecidable. n = 20 would fully suffice. Such a value is needed
more in order to avoid uncertain decryption, however less probable in
differential fields, as the range of solutions is infinite, than for growing
security. Besides, if there was found some attack for the HDPE (Hid-
den Differential Polynomial Equations) scheme, it will work better with
HPE. As of now, HDPE trapdoor problem seems undecidable, and
the scheme effective. The author is working to come up with concrete
examples of this kind of cryptosystems. Unfortunately, everything in
the topic is still handmade, and therefore rather time-consuming.
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